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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this 
case under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). The Supreme Court is 
authorized to transfer this appeal to the Court of Appeals under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Draper City appellees accept the statement of issues 1 
and 2 addressing plaintiff/appellant's claims against Draper as 
adequate for the purposes of this appeal. Draper City adopts and 
incorporates by this reference the standing issue identified by 
the Brown appellees in their brief. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-15 (1953): 
The city or any person aggrieved by any 
decision of the board of adjustment may have 
and maintain a plenary action for relief 
therefrom in any court of competent 
jurisdiction; provided, petition for such 
relief is presented to the court within 
thirty days after filing of such decision in 
the office of the board. 
Note: Sanders cites and relies upon provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-9-1001 and 1002 for his statute of limitation and private 
cause of action arguments. These statutes were enacted by the 
Legislature in 1991; whereas, the events giving rise to this 
action occurred in the 1980s and Sanders filed his complaint in 
April of 1990. Therefore, the provisions of §§ 10-9-1001 and 
1002 are inapplicable to this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Despite the length of time required to dispose of this case 
at the trial court level, the case was and is relatively simple 
as it applies to the claims against Draper City, both factually 
and legally. In 1978, just after Draper had incorporated as a 
city, the Draper City Planning Commission denied an application 
for subdivision of a five acre lot into smaller parcels. In 1979 
the City Board of Adjustment approved a variance on the same 
property which, after the addition of one adjoining acre of 
property, was approved for creation of three parcels or lots 
conditioned upon completion of some improvements. Sanders 
complains of this 1979 action and argues that it is void. 
Also in 1979 the owner of one of the three lots created by 
the variance sold half of the lot to another, thereby creating an 
additional parcel. In 1988 the City granted a variance on the 
additional parcel, subject to certain conditions. 
In April of 1990 Sanders commenced this action against the 
City and Municipality of Draper, the Draper City Board of 
Adjustment, the Draper City Planning Committee, the Draper City 
Council, and Charles L. Hoffman, Mayor of the City of Draper 
(collectively referred to herein as the "City") and against 
Robert Brown, Kim Stevens and John Does I through X. Sanders' 
claims against the City are essentially that(l) its 1979 variance 
was void; (2) the 1988 variance was improper; and (3) it has 
allegedly failed to enforce the conditions attached to the 1979 
and 1988 variances. 
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In June of 1990 the Draper defendants filed with the trial 
court a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) they owed 
Sanders no duty on which he could base his claims, (2) the claims 
were barred by the governmental immunity statute, and (3) the 
claims were barred by running of applicable statutes of 
limitations. The trial court (Russon, J.) granted the motion and 
entered an order of dismissal of the Draper defendants on 
November 26, 1990. 
Sanders subsequently proceeded with his claims against Kim 
Stevens and Robert Brown, for which judgment was eventually 
entered against him. He has now appealed to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of review of the trial court's grant of the 
City's motion to dismiss, the facts are those contained in the 
Complaint, to be taken as true. Not all of the alleged facts, 
however, are material to the issues of duty and running of the 
statute of limitations, the grounds for which the dismissal was 
entered. Nor is this Court, as stated by Sanders (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 3 n. 1), required to accept as true those legal 
conclusions which are alleged in the Complaint.-' To the extent 
necessary for an understanding of the legal and factual issues 
involved in reviewing the claims against the Draper City 
- Allegations that the 1979 variance approval was illegal or that the 
property had been illegally subdivided are examples of such legal conclusions. 
However, because these conclusions are immaterial to the trial court's 
dismissal of the claims against the City, they are not discussed herein and 
should not color this Court's view of the relevant facts. 
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appellees, the statement of facts of the Brown appellees is 
adopted and incorporated herein by this reference. 
1. In 1978 the Draper City Planning Commission denied an 
application to subdivide a five acre piece of property, part of 
which is the subject of this action. (R. 279-80). 
2. In 1979 the Draper City Board of Adjustment approved a 
variance, subject to conditions, permitting the division of the 
five acre parcel and an adjoining one acre parcel into three 
lots. (R. 281-83, 580). 
3. At all times relevant to Sanders' claims against Draper 
City, there was no mechanism to notify cities that property 
within their limits had been sold. Nor were there any statutes, 
ordinances or other requirements which would impose an 
affirmative duty on a city, or grant it power, to examine titles 
and conveyances of properties to determine whether subdivision 
violations were occurring, to prevent sale of noncomplying 
property or to void sales of property. 
4. On July 20, 1988, the Draper City Board of Adjustment 
granted to Mountainwest and Ovard a variance, subject to 
conditions, on the front parcel. (R. 1554). 
5. Sanders commenced this action by filing a Complaint 
dated April 23, 1990. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The private duty doctrine is well established in Utah law 
and provides that a tort claim may not be pursued against a 
governmental entity based upon a duty owed by the government to 
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the general public. Rather, the plaintiff must identify a 
recognized duty specifically owed to him rather than to the 
public at large. Sanders has failed to identify, either here or 
at the trial court level, any such duties which do not clearly 
fall within the public duty doctrine. 
Sanders' argument that the public duty doctrine should be 
abandoned in Utah is weak and finds no support in recent Utah 
case law. In 1991 the Utah Supreme Court decided in a 4-1 
decision not to do away with the public duty doctrine and in two 
1993 cases applied the public duty doctrine to claims against 
governmental entities. It continued to recognize the public duty 
doctrine in 1996. Likewise, the Utah Court of Appeals has 
consistently and recently applied the public duty doctrine, most 
recently in 1994. 
The trial court properly applied this well established 
doctrine when it decided that Sanders had identified no duty owed 
by the City to him as an individual as distinguished from a duty 
owed to the general public. The trial court's conclusion should 
be affirmed by this Court. 
Aside from the fact that the City owed Sanders no duty, 
resulting in the failure of his tort claims, Sanders also failed 
to bring his action against the City within the statutory 
limitation periods. He initiated no judicial appeal of the board 
of adjustment decisions within the thirty day period, as provided 
by statute. Nor did he assert his more general claims until 
nearly eight years after they had accrued. Clearly, he has 
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failed to take action within the statutory limitation periods and 
his claims are barred• 
In addition, Sanders' claims against the City are barred by 
the express provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act. The 
acts of granting permits and conducting investigations are 
clearly discretionary and are expressly immune from civil action. 
The trial court properly applied the law to each of these 
claims. There is no basis in the record for a finding that the 
court improperly interpreted any of the legal issues involved. 
The judgment of the trial court should, therefore, be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE CLAIMS 
AGAINST THE CITY BECAUSE IT OWED NO DUTY TO 
SANDERS. 
It is difficult to determine from Sanders' complaint and 
from his Appellant's Brief the exact nature of the duty which he 
believes the City owed him.-7 After urging the abandonment of 
the public duty doctrine, he alternatively argues that exceptions 
to the doctrine apply to him. However, he fails to allege or 
argue facts which would reasonably lead to the conclusion that he 
falls within one of the alleged exceptions. Nor does he identify 
a specific duty which the City owed to him as an individual. 
Rather, he argues that he should be permitted to pursue his 
claims against the city for "its failure to discharge its 
- The Draper City appellees adopt and incorporate by this reference 
the argument that Sanders lacks standing to assert any claim in this action as 
set forth in the brief of the Brown appellees. 
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statutory duty to enforce the law." He fails to specify what 
specific actions the city would be required to take, how those 
actions arise from a recognized legal duty and how such a duty 
would be owed to him as an individual rather than to the public 
at large. 
A. THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE HAS BEEN OFTEN AND RECENTLY 
AFFIRMED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AS APPLICABLE IN UTAH TO 
CLAIMS AGAINST MUNICIPALITIES. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
APPLIED THE DOCTRINE TO SANDERS' CLAIMS. 
Sanders relies on foreign case law for his argument that the 
public duty doctrine should be abandoned in Utah and in support 
of his assertions of various exceptions to application of the 
doctrine. This examination of the law of other states is, 
however, unnecessary. Utah has extensive and recent case law 
which deals with the public duty doctrine and clearly establishes 
the nature and scope of the law of this state under that 
doctrine. 
To make a prima facie case of negligence, Sanders must first 
establish a duty of care owed by the City to him. E.g., Ferree 
v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). Where there is no duty, 
there can be no negligence as a matter of law. Nelson By and 
Through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah 
1996) . The public duty doctrine defines the parameters of a duty 
owed by a governmental entity which is sufficient to form the 
basis for a negligence action: 
For a governmental agency and its agents to be 
liable for negligently caused injury suffered by a 
member of the public, the plaintiff must show a 
breach of a duty owed him as an individual, not 
merely the breach of an obligation owed to the 
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general public at large by the governmental 
official. 
Ferree at 151, citing Obray v. Malmbercr. 484 P.2d 160, 162 (Utah 
1971). See also Beach v. Univ. of Utah. 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986) 
(rules and regulations of the government-owned university were 
insufficient to establish a duty to a particular student as 
opposed to a duty to the university population at large). 
Since Ferree and Beach, this Court and the Utah Supreme 
Court have had several opportunities to evaluate the 
applicability of the public policy doctrine. For example, in 
Rollins v. Petersen. 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1991), the Supreme Court 
identified the pragmatic nature of the analysis under the public 
duty doctrine and discussed when special relationships would 
establish a specific duty to an individual aside from any duty to 
the general public. The Rollins court identified the analysis as 
a pragmatic one in which the need to protect a particular 
plaintiff is weighed against the needs of the general public for 
the governmental entity to effectively do its job. Rollins 
1160-61. Citing Ferree. the Rollins court noted that conversion 
of a general public duty to a specific duty owed to an individual 
would impose too broad a duty on public entities which would 
interfere with their abilities to perform their jobs. Rollins at 
1160. 
In Madsen v. Borthick. 850 P.2d 442 (Utah 1993), the Supreme 
Court again affirmed the trial court's application of the public 
duty doctrine to find no duty owed to the plaintiffs. The Madsen 
court held that statutory provisions did not create a duty owed 
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to the plaintiffs absent clear evidence of a special relationship 
and do not imply a duty beyond that imposed by the express 
language of the statute. Madsen at 446-47. 
Also in 1993 the Supreme Court discussed the public policy 
surrounding the doctrine in Hiaains v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 
231 (Utah 1993). The Hiaains court acknowledged that there may 
be circumstances in which a governmental entity may owe a duty to 
a specific individual apart from that owed to the public at 
large. It noted that the approach to determining whether a 
special relationship exists sufficient to impose a duty is a 
policy-based one. Hiaains at 236. 
Determining whether the actor has a duty to 
prevent another's harm requires careful 
consideration of the consequences of imposing that 
duty for the parties and for society. We are 
loath to recognize a duty that is realistically 
incapable of performance or fundamentally at odds 
with the nature of the parties' relationship. 
Accordingly, in determining the existence of a 
duty, we examine such factors as the identity and 
character of the actor, the victim, and the 
victimizer, the relationship of the actor to the 
victim and the victimizer, and the practical 
impact that finding a special relationship would 
have. 
Hiaains at 237 (citations omitted). 
The Hiaains court also noted that its "pragmatic, policy-
based analysis" generally has led to the conclusion that 
if the broad claim for a special relationship and 
the consequent duty was accepted, the defendant in 
question would be unable to perform the duty 
without either radically changing its character or 
drastically circumscribing the function it was 
charged with performing. 
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Higgins at 237. While the Higgins court recognized that it may 
be appropriate to find a duty toward individuals or narrow 
classes of individuals, it "rejected the claims for broad 
categories of special relationships which operatively seem to be 
indistinguishable from a general negligence theory," Id. 
In 1996 the Supreme Court once again acknowledged the 
viability of the public duty doctrine, though holding that the 
municipality had assumed an independent duty toward the 
plaintiff. Nelson 919 P.2d 568. 
This Court has also recently discussed and applied the 
public duty doctrine. Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't of Transp., 828 
P.2d 53 5 (Utah App. 1992) (under public duty doctrine, city owed 
no duty to pedestrian to control transients); Cannon v. Univ. of 
Utah, 866 P.2d 586 (Utah App. 1993) (public duty doctrine barred 
claims and University owed no special duty to plaintiffs); 
DeVilliers v. Utah County, 882 P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1994) (county 
owed no duty to plaintiffs to install warning signs on county 
road). 
Sanders argues that the public duty doctrine should be 
abolished in Utah. The cases he cites are all foreign cases 
older than the recent Utah cases addressing and applying the 
doctrine. Also, Rollins clearly rejects this argument. In 
Rollins, Justice Durham, in her concurring and dissenting 
opinion, while acknowledging that the public duty doctrine "is 
probably still followed in a majority of states," Rollins at 
1165, suggests that the court should "reconsider the continued 
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application of the public duty doctrine." Rollins at 1166. That 
position, however, was rejected by the 4-1 majority of the court. 
The public duty doctrine is alive and well in Utah and the 
trial court properly applied the doctrine in its ruling on the 
City's motion to dismiss. 
Sanders argues that there are recognized exceptions to the 
public duty doctrine. This is, however, not technically correct. 
As part of the public duty doctrine, a plaintiff may only 
maintain a negligence action if he can demonstrate a duty, 
independent from that owed to the public at large, on which to 
base the negligence claims. In Nelson, for example, the court 
held that the city had, by performing a function which it was not 
required to perform, independently created a tort duty to the 
plaintiff. Other cases require the existence of a special 
relationship which is sufficient to defeat the policy interest in 
applying the public duty doctrine. In other words, the issue is 
not whether Sanders can demonstrate that he falls within an 
"exception" to the public duty doctrine, but whether he can 
demonstrate a recognized duty owed to him independently of the 
duty owed to the general public, i.e., that the duty flowed to 
him as an individual "distinguishable from the mass." Hiaains at 
237. 
Sanders also argues that the legislature, in enacting Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-9-1002, created a private remedy for individuals 
against government entities which precludes application of the 
public duty doctrine. While a creative argument, it has two 
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flaws, one of which is fatal. First, Sanders cites no authority 
for this argument. Second, and more importantly, § 10-9-1002 did 
not take effect until more than a year after Sanders initiated 
this action and nearly a year after the court entered its order 
for dismissal. A legislative enactment which affects vested 
rights cannot be applied retroactively unless there is a clear 
legislative expression of intent to do so. Cache County v. 
Property Tax Div., 922 P.2d 758, 767 (Utah 1996). There is no 
expression of legislative intent to make § 10-0-1002 retroactive. 
It is, therefore, irrelevant to the issue as decided by the trial 
court and before this Court on appeal.-7 
B. THE CITY OWED SANDERS NO SPECIFIC DUTY INDEPENDENT OF THAT 
OWED TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC, 
The duty imposed on the City by state statutes and City 
ordinances is a duty owed to the general public. The "statutory 
duty to enforce the law"-' is a duty owed the general public and 
not to Sanders independently from the public at large. Whether 
Sanders, as an individual, was arguably injured by a breach of 
this general duty has nothing to do with the threshold issue of 
whether the duty was one owed to him, as an individual, or to the 
general public. 
- Aside from the fact that § 10-9-1002 doesn't apply, the Utah Supreme 
Court has rejected the argument that characterizing a claim as one for 
mandamus is sufficient to avoid compliance with statutory requirements for 
appeal. Crist v. Mapleton City, 497 P.2d 633, 634 (Utah 1972) ("A writ of 
mandamus is not a substitute for and cannot be used in civil proceedings to 
serve the purpose of appeal, certiorari, or writ of error.") 
-
;
 Sanders' terms. 
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Despite Sanders' characterizations in his Appellate Brief, 
the only claims of duty identified by him in his complaint are of 
a general nature indicating statutory duties to the public at 
large: 
39. That since the time the City of Draper has 
become aware of the conduct of Ovard which is 
contrary to state law and City of Draper 
ordinance, the City of Draper has ignored and 
continues to ignore those circumstances and has 
failed to enforce its laws and the laws of the 
State of Utah or has attempted to enforce those 
ordinances and laws in an ineffective manner. 
40. That the City of Draper has a duty to police, 
manage and regulate the development of real 
property within its municipal borders and has 
utterly failed, in this case, in that duty.-7 
42. That, among other things, there is a duty on 
the part of the City of Draper, by way of 
enforcement of its ordinances and the laws of the 
State of Utah to prosecute violations of those 
laws and ordinances. ... 
Complaint (R. 8)(emphasis added). Nowhere in his complaint did 
Sanders identify a duty which the City owed to him independent of 
the duties he alleged which were owed to the general public. 
Apparently attempting to fall within the Hiaains and Madsen 
narrow class provisions, Sanders argued before the trial court 
that (1) "there is an underlying intent to regulate the 
development and growth of a municipality behind these statutes 
which is designed to benefit all landowners in the city" and (2) 
"The Plaintiffs herein are certainly members of that particular 
-
7
 The City disagrees that, as a matter of law, it had a duty to police 
and manage the development of property. For purposes of the motion to 
dismiss, this allegation has been treated as true although it is an erroneous 
conclusion of law. 
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class of persons which these ordinances were designed to 
benefit . . . " (R. 62) On its face, however, this is an 
argument that Sanders' interests are identical to those of the 
general public. This certainly is not the "narrow class" 
distinguishable "from the mass" contemplated in Higgins. 
Accepting the factual allegations of the complaint as true, 
the trial court properly applied the public duty doctrine and 
properly held that Sanders demonstrated no independent duty owed 
by the City to him. As a result, the dismissal of the claims 
against the City for lack of a duty was proper and should be 
affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT SANDERS' 
CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE RUNNING OF APPLICABLE 
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS. 
Sanders' claims against the City are essentially of two 
types: (1) two claims that board of adjustment decisions were 
improper (the 1979 and 1988 variances) and (2) an "ongoing 
failure to abide by the law." Appellant's brief, p. 19. Neither 
claim has been made within the applicable statutory period. 
Sanders' claims related to the granting of variances fall 
within the express provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-15 (1953) 
which was the statute applicable to these claims at the time the 
causes of action arose. That section expressly provides for a 
thirty day period after the grant of the variances in which 
Sanders had to commence judicial action. 
The city or any person aggrieved by any 
decision of the board of adjustment may have 
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and maintain a plenary action for relief 
therefrom in any court of competent 
jurisdiction; provided, petition for such 
relief is presented to the court within 
thirty days after filing of such decision in 
the office of the board. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-15 (emphasis added). 
The statutory period had obviously long since run on the 
1979 variance before Sanders acquired the property. He did, 
however, have the opportunity to take appropriate action if he 
considered the 1988 variance to have been improper. He did not 
do so until nearly two years after the variance was granted, well 
beyond the statutory thirty day period. As a result, Sanders' 
claims related to the board of adjustment grants of variances are 
barred as a matter of law. 
Clearly, by the end of 1982 Sanders was aware of the 
problem, the injury and the alleged failure of the City. At that 
time, the last event necessary to assert the claims which Sanders 
makes against the City had occurred. In other words, the cause 
of action had accrued and the limitation period began to run. 
Sanders did not commence his action against the City until 
nearly eight years after it had accrued, well beyond the 
statutory periods. Nor did he commence his claims arising from 
the board of adjustment actions within the statutorily required 
thirty day period. As a result, the trial court correctly ruled 
that his claims against the City were barred by the running of 
the applicable statutes of limitation. 
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POINT III 
SANDERS' CLAIMS AGAINST THE CITY ARE BARRED 
BY THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
Though the trial court did not base its motion to dismiss on 
the governmental immunity act, this issue was presented by the 
City in its memorandum discussion. R. 52-53). Because this 
issue was preserved before the trial court, it is appropriate for 
this Court to consider the issue. See Debry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 
428, 444 (Utah 1995) ("It is well-settled that an appellate court 
may affirm a trial court's ruling on any proper grounds, even 
though the trial court relied on some other ground.") 
The types of claims asserted by Sanders fall within the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1953, as amended 1989), 
the statutes applicable at the time suit was initiated. Section 
63-30-10(1)(a) provides immunity for discretionary functions. 
Investigation and prosecution of alleged ordinance violations are 
discretionary functions which are immune. Obray at 162. Section 
63-30-10(1)(c) establishes immunity for alleged negligence in 
"the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of or the failure 
or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any permit, license, 
certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization." Claims 
based on these activities are barred because these activities 
"are essential governmental functions that must be free from tort 
liability." Gillman v. Dep't of Financial Inst.. 782 P.2d 506, 
512 (Utah 1989). Section 63-30-10(1)(d) provides immunity for 
failing to inspect property or by reason of making an inadequate 
or negligent inspection of property. 
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Sanders' claims of failure to investigate and prosecute, 
improperly granting or revoking variances, and failing to 
"properly police the development and subdivision" of property all 
fall within the scope of these areas of immunity. As a result, 
they are barred by the governmental immunity act. 
CONCLUSION 
The public duty doctrine clearly applies in Utah to tort 
claims against governmental entities to preclude liability to 
individuals based upon duties owed to the general public. 
Sanders has failed to state any duty owed to him independent of 
that owed to the general public and has, therefore, failed to 
state a duty on which his action can be based. 
In addition, Sanders' claims are barred by the running of 
the appropriate statutes of limitation and by the governmental 
immunity act. 
As a result, the holdings of the trial court are correct as 
a matter of law and should be affirmed. 
DATED this «•>» day of March, 1997. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
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